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Abstract
Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006) prove that the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of rst-price auctions is unique. This uniqueness
requires the assumption that a buyer never bids above his value. We
demonstrate that, in asymmetric rst-price auctions (with or without
a minimum bid), the relaxation of this assumption results in additional
equilibria that are substantial.Although in each of these additional
equilibria no buyer wins with a bids above his value, the allocation
of the object and the selling price may vary among the equilibria.
Furthermore, we show that such phenomena can only occur under
asymmetry in the distributions of values.
JEL Codes: C72, D44.
Keywords: asymmetric auctions, rst-price auctions, multiple
equilibria.
1 Introduction
In symmetric auctions, there is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium (see Vickrey,
1961, and McAdams, 2007).1 This uniqueness also applies to asymmetric
Dept. of Economics, University of Exeter, UK, and Dept. of Economics, University
of Haifa, Israel.
yThe Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
1This uniqueness requires a low bound for the bids (such as 0). See Baye and Morgan
(1999) and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) for details.
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auctions; however, with the additional assumption that a buyer never bids
above his value (see Lebrun, 2006, and Maskin and Riley, 2003). In this note,
we demonstrate that, in asymmetric rst-price auctions (with or without a
minimum bid), the relaxation of this assumption may result in additional
equilibria that are substantially di¤erent from each other. Although in each
of these additional equilibria no buyer wins with a bid above his value, the
allocation of the object and the selling price vary among the equilibria. These
additional equilibria are closely related to equilibria in an environment with
a minimum bid where buyers do not bid above their values.
To present our main observation, consider the following example.
Example 1 Buyer 1 has values drawn uniformly from [0,5]. Buyer 2 has
values drawn uniformly from [6,7]. There is no minimum bid.
Claim 1 Equilibrium 1: The following pair of inverse bid functions form an
equilibrium, buyer 1 bids his value if v1  3 (i.e., v1(b) = b if b < 3), and,
otherwise,
v1(b) =
36
(2b  6)  1
5

e
9
4
+ 6
6 2b + 24  4b
; (1)
v2(b) = 6 +
36
(2b  6) (20) e  94  66 2b   4b
: (2)
for 3  b  41
3
(see Figure 1 for a graph of the bid functions).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium 1. The thicker line is buyer 1s bid function.
Proof. It follows from Kaplan and Zamir (2011a) that this is the unique
equilibrium under the assumption that no buyer bids more than his value.
Now, by allowing buyers to bid more than their values, we are able present
two other equilibria in which such bidding occurs o¤ the equilibrium path.
Claim 2 Equilibrium 2: The following vector of bid functions eb form an
equilibrium. Buyer 1 bids eb1(v1) = v12 + 2 if v1 > 4 and eb1(v1) = v1=4 + 3;
otherwise. Buyer 2 bids eb2(v2) = v22 + 1: (See Figure 2.)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium 2. The thicker line is buyer 1s bid function.
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Proof. To prove that this is indeed an equilibrium we argue as follows.
 Since buyer 2 is always bidding 4 or more, buyer 1 with v1 < 4, has no
protable deviation since any deviation to b1 < 4 is irrelevant and any
deviation to b1 > 4 yields a negative expected payo¤.
 Buyer 2 with value v2 cannot prot by deviating to b2 < 4. Indeed,
the probability of winning with such a bid is 4(b2  3)=5 and hence the
best bid in this region is
eb2 = arg max
b22[3;4]
4(b2   3)
5
(v2   b2) = minfmaxfv2 + 3
2
; 3g; 4g = 4;
since v2  6:
 Buyer 2 with value v2 bidding b2 in [4; 4:5] has probability (2b2   4)=5
of winning. Hence, his best bid in this region is
eb2 = arg max
b22[4;4:5]
2b2   4
5
(v2   b) = minfmaxfv2
2
+ 1; 4g; 4:5g = v2
2
+ 1;
since v2 2 [6; 7].
Buyer 1 with v1 > 4 cannot prot by deviating to b1 < 4 (again since
buyer 2 is always bidding 4 or more). For b1 2 [4; 4:5], the probability of
winning is (2b1   8) and hence the best reply to buyer 2s bid function is
eb1 = arg max
b12[4;4:5]
(2b1   8) (v1   b) = v1
2
+ 2:
Claim 3 Equilibrium 3: The following vector of bid functions bb form an
equilibrium. Buyer 1 bids bb1(v1) = v1=5 + 4 and buyer 2 bids 5. (See Figure
3.)
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Figure 3: Equilibrium 3. The thicker line is buyer 1s bid function.
Proof. Note that buyer 1 has no incentive to deviate to bidding above 5
since winning would yield a negative prot for him. There is also no incentive
for buyer 1 to deviate to a bid below 5 since it would yield the same prot of
zero. Given buyer 1s strategy, buyer 2 then faces the following maximization
problem:
bb2(v2) = arg max
b22[0;5]
(b2   4)(v2   b2) = minfmaxfv2 + 4
2
; 4g; 5g = 5;
since v2  6:
The revenue clearly di¤ers among all three equilibria; yet, this is still
consistent with revenue equivalence (Myerson, 1982) since all three equilibria
yield di¤erent allocations, and hence revenue need not be the same. See
Figure 4 for the expected revenue and probability that buyer 1 wins in each
of the possible equilibria.
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Probability that buyer 1 wins Revenue
Equilibrium 1 0.13333 3.99099
Equilibrium 2 0.1 4.26666
Equilibrium 3 0 5
Figure 4: Probability that buyer 1 wins and the expected revenue in each
of the three equilibria.
2 Model
Consider n buyers bidding for an indivisible good. Each buyer i has his value
drawn from a distribution Fi with support [vi; vi] (where 0  vi < vi): This
environment will be xed throughout the paper. The selling mechanism that
we will consider is a rst-price auction with a minimum bid m; which we
denote by Am. Let bi : [vi; vi]! R denote a bid function (pure strategy) and
b = (bi)
n
i=1 denote a vector of bid functions.
Denition 1 An equilibrium bm of auction Am is said to be standard if
P (fbmi (vi) > vi and bmi (vi)  mg) = 0 for all i; otherwise, it is called non-
standard.
In order to ellaborate on the denition, let us call an acceptable bid, a
bid greater than or equal to the minimum bid. Now, the above denition says
in a standard equilibrium no buyer makes an acceptable bid that is (strictly)
above his value, even if such bids that never win in equilibrium. In contrast,
in a non-standard equilibrium there is a least one buyer that with positive
probability makes an acceptable bid that is strictly above his value (but still
never wins in the equilibrium).
Note that for our model, there is a unique standard equilibrium; see
Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006). Also, as said before, in a non-
standard equilibrium, although some buyers may bid above their values, no
buyer that bids above his value wins with positive probability. Such bidding
cannot occur in equilibrium since such a buyer would have a protable de-
viation (for example, bidding his value). Nevertheless, as we already saw in
our example, the ability to bid above ones value may substantially a¤ect the
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allocation of the object and the selling price. In the above example, the rst
equilibrium is standard, while the other two are non-standard.
In the following, we will compare equilibria of two di¤erent mechanisms,
namely, two rst-price auctions with di¤erent minimum bids.
Denition 2 A vector of bid functions bm in auction Am is said to be equiv-
alent to a vector of bid functions bem in auction Aem if for any realization of
values of the buyers, both vectors yield the same ex-post payo¤s for the buyers
and the seller and the same allocation of the good. We denote equivalence
between bm and bem by bm  bem.
Remark 1 As we shall see, the equivalence bm  bem does not imply the
equality of the bid functions, bm = bem: In the opposite direction, bm = bem
does not imply bm  bem:
As an example of the rst claim in the remark, consider the environment
where buyer 1 has a value uniformly drawn from [0; 1] and buyer 2 has a
value uniformly drawn from [4; 5]: Consider two equilibria for two di¤erent
minimum bids. With a minimum bid of 0, buyer 1 bids his value and buyer 2
bids 1. With a minimum bid of 1, buyer 1 bids 0 and buyer 2 bids 1. These
two equilibria are equivalent but have di¤erent bid functions.
For an example in the opposite direction, consider the symmetric auction
where both buyers have values drawn uniformly on [0; 1] and bid half their
value. This is an equilibrium when the minimum bid is 0 and when the
minimum bid is 1. However, in the former case, buyers always receive the
object and in the latter case they never do. Hence, the two equilibria are not
equivalent.
Generalizing the insight from the example to show the rst part of the
remark, consider two buyers where buyer 1s value distribution is on [0; 1] and
buyer 2s value distribution is on [; ] where 0 <  < : Assume that there
is a minimum bid m where 0 < m < : (For now, assume that whenever
there is a tie, the winner is buyer 2.) Consider a standard equilibrium with
this minimum bidm: This is still an equilibrium if it is modied with the only
change that whenever buyer 1s value is below m, he bids m. Furthermore,
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if the minimum bid is now lowered to em < m, this modied vector of bid
functions is still an equilibrium, but it is clearly non-standard. The following
proposition captures this intuition (without the assumption regarding the
case of a tie).
Proposition 1 For any standard equilibrium bm of auction Am where
mini vi < m < maxi vi and for any em < m, there exists a non-standard
equilibrium bem of auction Aem that is equivalent to bm (bem  bm):
Proof. It is enough to prove this for bm in which bmi (vi)  m if and only
if vi  m. If instead bm does not satisfy this condition, we can construct
an equivalent standard equilibrium bbm of Am that does satisfy this property.
Since the equivalence relationship is clearly transitive, any non-standard bem
equivalent to bbm would also be equivalent to bm. More specically, dene bbm
as follows: bbmi (vi) def= bmi (vi) for all i, and for all vi  m where bmi (vi)  m and
for all vi < m (and hence bmi (vi) < m since b
m is a standard equilibrium).
Also, dene bbmi (vi) def= m+vi2 for all i, for all vi  m where bmi (vi) < m. Notice
that when vi  m and bmi (vi) < m; buyer i is not winning (with positive
probability) in bm and hence bbmi (vi) is also not winning against bm i since this
would be a protable deviation which is impossible since bm is an equilibrium
of Am. Since by construction, bbmj (vj)  bmj (vj) for all j 6= i, bbmi (vi) is also
not winning against bbm i. Thus, bbm  bm. Finally, bbm is an equilibrium of
auction Am since the winning bids are the same as in bm and the losing bids
are weakly higher.
Given an equilibrium bm of auction Am where mini vi < m < maxi vi
and em < m, let " be such that 0 < " < minfmaxi vi   m;m   em;mg:
Dene bem as follows: bemi (vi) def= bmi (vi) for all i and for all vi  m and
bemi (vi) def= m   " + Fi(vi)Fi(m)" for all vi s.t. vi < m. We created bem from bm
by keeping the bids the same for values weakly above m and distributing all
bids below m uniformly on the interval [m  ";m]. We now proceed to show
that bem is a non-standard equilibrium of auction Aem and it is equivalent to
bm under the assumption that bmi (vi)  m if and only if vi  m.
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Step 1. bem  bm.
Any buyer i with vi > m always bids higher than m in b
m and hence by
denition any buyer i with vi > m always bids higher than m in b
em. Since
maxi vi > m, both in b
em and in bm, there is at least one buyer whose bid is
greater than or equal to m for all his values (i.e., with probability 1). Hence,
no buyer wins with positive probability with a bid strictly below m. Since
bemi (vi) = bmi (vi) for values vi  m, the allocation and the price paid for the
object in bem of auction Aem is the same as in the equilibrium bm of auction
Am. Thus, bem  bm.
Step 2. We next show that bem is an equilibrium of Aem.
Step 2a. In bem of auction Aem, no buyer with value less than m has an
incentive to deviate.
In fact, since the selling price is always greater than or equal to m, no
buyer with a value less than m would have an incentive to deviate; any
deviation to a bid less than m would not a¤ect the payo¤ (as it would never
win) and any deviation to a bid greater than or equal to m would result in
a non-positive payo¤.
Step 2b. In bem of auction Aem, no buyer i with value vi  m has an
incentive to deviate to bi  m.
Recall that by denition of bem, we have bemi (vi) = bmi (vi) for all vi  m
(and hence from our assumption on bm for all bmi (vi)  m). Since the distri-
bution of bids above m is the same for both bem and bm and in bm there is
no incentive to deviate to a bid above m, in bem there is also no incentive to
deviate to a bid above m. Formally, letWmi (bi; b
m
 i) be the winning probabil-
ity of buyer i when bidding bi against b
m
 i in auction A
m and let W emi (bi; bem i)
be his winning probability when bidding bi against b
em
 i in auction A
em. Let
mi (vi; bi; b
m
 i)
def
= Wmi (bi; b
m
 i)(vi   bi) and  emi (vi; bi; bem i) def= W emi (bi; bem i)(vi  
bi) be the expected prot of buyer i when bidding bi against b
m
 i in auction
Am and against bem i in auction Aem, respectively. Observe that for all bi  m;
it follows from the denition of bem thatW emi (bi; bm i) =Wmi (bi; bem i) and hence
mi (vi; bi; b
m
 i) = 
em
i (vi; bi; b
em
 i). Since 
m
i (vi; b
m
i (vi); b
m
 i)  mi (vi; bi; bm i)
for all bi  m (since bm is an equilibrium), we have  emi (vi; bemi (vi); bem i) =
 emi (vi; bmi (vi); bem i) = mi (vi; bmi (vi); bm i)  mi (vi; bi; bm i) =  emi (vi; bi; bem i) for
all bi  m:
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Step 2c. In bem of auction Aem, no buyer i with value vi  m has an
incentive to deviate to bi < m.
Since, as we saw in the proof of Step 1, there is a buyer j that in bem bids
m or more with probability one (namely, any buyer j with vj  m), no buyer
i 6= j has a protable deviation to bid bi < m since such a bid would not win.
It remains to show that j also has no incentive to deviate to bj < m. Now if
there are two or more buyers with vj  m; then there is no incentive for any
such buyer to bid bj < m since another buyer j0 with vj0  m is bidding m
or more with probability one. Hence, we are only left with the case of one
buyer j with vj  m and all other n  1 buyers with vi < m.
From the denition of bem, there are no bids below m   "; hence clearly
any bj < m  " is not protable. Thus, it is enough to show that for buyer j
and for any possible value vj, the expected prot of bidding bj 2 [m  ";m)
is increasing in bj. If this is so and if there is a protable deviation to
bj 2 [m ";m), then there is a protable deviation to m (the expected prot
is upper semi-continuous). This would be in contradiction to what we proved
in Step 2b.
To prove this monotonicity, note that
@ emj (vj ;b;b em j)
@b
= W em0(b; bem j)(vj  
b)  W em(b; bem j) and also note that by the denition of bemi (vi) the distribu-
tion of bids for values below m of player i is uniform on [m   ";m): Since
all other n   1 buyers bid [m   ";m) with positive probability, we have
W em(b; bem j) = (b  (m  "))n 1 =c (for b 2 [m   ";m)), and W em0(b; bem j) =
(n   1) (b  (m  "))n 2 =c where c is a constant. Hence, since n  2, we
have
@ emj (vj; b; bem j)
@b
=
(b  (m  "))n 2
c
[(n  1)(vj   b)  (b  (m  "))]
 (b  (m  "))
n 2
c
[vj   2b+m  "] :
The expression (b (m "))
n 2
c
 0 for all b 2 [m ";m]: Since " < vj m, when
b = m; the expression vj   2b+m  " = vj  m  "  vj  m  "  0. Since
this last expression is strictly decreasing in b, it is positive for b < m. Hence,
@ emj (vj ;b;b em j)
@b
 0 for all b 2 [m  ";m): This together with the condition that
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W em(m  "; bem j) = 0 prove that  emj (vj;m; bem j)   emj (vj; b; bem j) for all b  m.
This concludes the proof that bem is an equilibrium of auction Aem:
Step 3. The equilibrium bem is non-standard.
Since there exists a buyer k with vk < m; there exists a  > 0 such that
for values between vk and vk + ; buyer k bids in the interval [m   ";m]:
For small enough " and , these bids are strictly greater than his values and
greater than em (since " < m  em); hence, bem is non-standard.
We now show that while the condition m < maxi vi appearing in Propo-
sition 1 is not necessary for the existence of a non-standard equilibrium, the
weaker condition, m  maxi vi, is a necessary condition.
Proposition 2 If m > maxi vi, then there does not exist a non-standard
equilibrium bm of auction Am.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there is a non-standard equilib-
rium bm of auction Am. Then, there is a buyer j with value vj that bids with
positive probability bj(vj) > vj where bj(vj)  m. There is also a positive
probability that maxi6=j vi < bj(vj) (since bj(vj)  m > maxi vi). These two
events are independent; hence, their intersection has positive probability. In
this event, buyer j will win the auction and pay more than his value, which
cannot be the case in equilibrium. Therefore, there cannot be a non-standard
equilibrium bm of auction Am.
Remark 2 The condition of Proposition 2 cannot be weakened to m 
maxi vi. In other words, there cannot be be a non-standard equilibrium when
m = maxi vi, as demonstrated by the following example. There are two buy-
ers with values uniformly distributed on [1; 2] and one buyer with a value
uniformly distributed on [0; 1=2] and a minimum bid m = 1. In this case,
m = maxi vi. There exists an equilibrium in which the rst two buyers bid
bi(vi) = (vi + 1)=2 for i = 1; 2 and vi 2 [1; 2] and buyer 3 bids b3(v3) = 1 for
all v3 2 [0; 1=2]. This equilibrium is non-standard since the buyer 3 bids is
strictly more than his value and weakly more than m.
We make use of Proposition 2 to prove a stronger result, namely:
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Proposition 3 If m > maxi vi and b
m is an equilibrium of auction Am, then
there does not exist an em and non-standard equilibrium bem of auction Aem
such that bem  bm.
Proof. By Proposition 2, bm must be a standard equilibrium of auction Am.
If em > maxi vi; then by Proposition 2, there is no non-standard equilibrium
of Aem. A fortiori, there is no non-standard equilibrium that is equivalent to
bm. So now we need to examine the case where em  maxi vi < m: Assume
that bem is a non-standard equilibrium of Aem. We will show that in this case,
there is a positive probability event in which the object is allocated in bm
of auction Am but not allocated in bem of auction Aem (and hence bem 6 bm).
Indeed this happens when there exists a buyer j such that em < vj < m
and maxi6=j vi < vj. Note that this happens with positive probability sinceem  maxi vi implies that em < maxi vi by the assumption that vi < vi for
all i. In this event, the object is not allocated in (the standard) equilibrium
bm since all values are below m. On the other hand, the object must be
allocated in equilibrium bem. Otherwise, all buyers with such values must bid
below em. However, if this were the case, then buyer j could earn strictly
positive prot by bidding vj   " for small enough " > 0 (s.t. vj   " > em).
We next show that any non-standard equilibrium has an equivalent stan-
dard equilibrium with a higher minimum bid.
Proposition 4 For any non-standard equilibrium bem of Aem; there exists an
m > em and a bm such that bm is a standard equilibrium of Am and bm  bem.
Proof. Consider m = supi;vifbemi (vi) : bemi (vi) > vi and bemi (vi)  emg. Clearly,
m  em. Dene bmi (vi) def= minfvi; bemi (vi)g. By denition of m, bemi (vi)  m
implies that bemi (vi)  vi. Hence, bmi (vi) = bemi (vi) for all bemi (vi)  m. In bem
of auction Aem, the probability that the winning bid is strictly below m is
zero. Otherwise, there is a positive probability that there is a buyer j who
wins while bidding bemj (vj)  b < m. Then, any bid greater than b (by any
buyer) must win with a positive probability. However, by denition of m,
there is a buyer k bidding bemk (vk) where m  bemk (vk) > vk and bemk (vk) > b.
This buyer k will be winning with positive probability in Aem while bidding
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above his value which cannot happen in equilibrium. Hence, bm  bem since
in both auctions all winning bids are (weakly) above m and in that region,
bm and bem coincide.
To see that bm is indeed an equilibrium of Am, observe that any buyer
i with value vi not winning in b
em is still not winning in bm and has no
incentive to change his bid bmi (vi) (since b
m
i (vi)  bemi (vi) and winning bids
are the same). If bemi (vi) is winning in bem of Aem, then bmi (vi) = bemi (vi)  m.
Since winning bids are the same, there are no protable deviations from bmi ,
since there are no protable deviations from bemi . We conclude that bm is
an equilibrium in Am, and as we proved before this implies that bm  bem.
Finally, since if m = em, then the same equilibrium would be standard and
non-standard a contradiction. Thus, m > em.
Given a non-standard equilibrium bem of Aem, let m(bem) be the minimum
bid stated in Proposition 4. Namely, m(bem) = supi;vifbemi (vi) : bemi (vi) > vi
and bemi (vi)  emg. The following corollary states that bemi is still a non-
standard equilibrium in any Abm with bm < m(bem).
Corollary 1 For any non-standard equilibrium bem of Aem; for any bm <
m(bem); bbm def= bem is a non-standard equilibrium of Abm and bbm  bem.
Proof. The arguments for why bbm is an equilibrium of Abm are similar
to that of the previous proposition. The equilibrium is non-standard sincebm < m(bem) and by the denition of m(bem) there is a buyer i with value vi
where bbmi (vi) > vi and bbmi (vi) > bmg.
In the examples in the Introduction, the second equilibrium eb which is
a non-standard equilibrium of A0 (rst-price auction with no minimum bid)
is such that b4
def
= eb is a standard equilibrium A4. Furthermore, these two
equilibria are equivalent: eb  b4. Similarly the third equilibrium bb is a non-
standard equilibrium of A0; bb4 def= bb is a non-standard equilibrium of A4,
while b5
def
= bb is a standard equilibrium in A5, and all three equilibria are
equivalent: bb  bb4  b5:
We can use the above results to conrm the result in the literature that
there are no non-standard equilibria in symmetric auctions.
13
Corollary 2 In a symmetric auction, there does not exist a non-standard
equilibrium.
Proof. Under symmetry, v def= vi for all i. By Proposition 2, there cannot
be a non-standard equilibrium when the minimum bid em > v: However, ifem = v, then there also cannot be a non-standard equilibrium since then
there would be a buyer bidding strictly above his value (and thereby strictly
above em). We would then have m(bem) > v. But by Corollary 1, there would
exist a non-standard equilibrium for v < bm < m(bem), in contradiction to
Proposition 2. If there are no non-standard equilibria for em = v, then there
are no non-standard equilibria for em < v. Since if em < v, in equilibrium the
innimum of the winning bids must not be strictly less than v. (Otherwise,
any buyer bidding close to this inmum would have a protable deviation.)
Hence, any non-standard equilibrium form < v would also be a non-standard
equilibrium for m = v.
In Kaplan and Zamir (2011b), it is proved that in a rst-price auction
with two buyers, in the region where the minimum bid is binding, raising
the minimum bid from em to m, the bid functions of both buyers in the
standard Bayes-Nash equilibrium increase (pointwise for v  m). Combined
with Proposition 4, we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 In a rst-price auctions with two buyers, if bem is a standard
equilibrium of Aem and b0em is a non-standard equilibrium of Aem, then the
revenue from b0em is strictly higher than the revenue from bem.
Proof. By Proposition 4, b0em is equivalent to a standard equilibrium bm
in Am where m > em (and therefore yields the same revenue). Denote by
Rev(bm) the expected selling price with bid functions bm. It follows from
Kaplan and Zamir (2011b) that Rev(b0em) = Rev(bm) > Rev(bem).
This means that in the two buyers case, from the perspective of the seller
the existence of a non-standard equilibrium is in a way an indication that the
minimum bid is not optimally set; it can be raised to yield higher revenue.
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3 Concluding remarks
Our main observation in this note is that in an asymmetric rst-price auction
Am with a minimum bid m; besides the unique standard equilibrium, there
may be additional non-standard equilibria where some buyers make an ac-
ceptable bid above their values. We nd that this multiplicity is non-trivial
in the sense that both revenue and the allocation of the good can be di¤er-
ent from those in the standard equilibrium. However, this can only occur in
asymmetric auctions. We characterize non-standard equilibria in four propo-
sitions. Our main result, Proposition 1, shows how a standard equilibrium
can form the basis for a non-standard equilibrium with a di¤erent (smaller)
minimum bid. Propositions 2 and 3 provide su¢ cient conditions under which
there does not exist a non-standard equilibrium. Finally, Proposition 4 shows
how a non-standard equilibrium can form the basis of a standard equilibrium
with a di¤erent (larger) minimum bid.
This paper ts into the small body of literature on multiple equilibria in
auctions. For rst-price auctions (equivalent to Bertrand price competition
with a unit demand), Baye and Morgan (1999) and Kaplan and Wettstein
(2000) show that there can be additional equilibria with mixed strategies.
These require that there is no lower bound on the bids submitted. Also,
in Bertrand price competition with asymmetric costs and complete informa-
tion, Erlei (2002) nds additional equilibria. For the second-price auction,
Blume and Heidhus (2004) and Blume et al. (2009), show that there can
be additional equilibria if one relaxes the assumption that buyers never bid
above their values. We follow them by also allowing buyers in a rst-price
auction to bid above their values and (weakly) above the minimum bid. This
seems worth considering given the large body of experimental literature that
shows that weakly dominated strategies are not always eliminated (see Bin-
more, 1999, for a discussion). We nd that these additional equilibria are
particularly important in rst-price asymmetric auctions since they may be
substantially di¤erent in both revenue and outcome. We conclude that the
widely used assumption that buyers do not bid above their values should be
taken more carefully in asymmetric auctions.
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